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Do Trustees and Administrators Matter? Diversifying the Faculty Across Gender Lines 
 
 
                                                      Abstract  
 
 
 Our paper focuses on the role that the gender composition of the leaders of 
American colleges and universities – trustees, presidents/chancellors, and 
provosts/academic vice presidents – plays in influencing the rate at which academic 
institutions diversify their faculty across gender lines. Our analyses make use of 
institutional level panel data that we have collected for a large sample of American 
academic institutions. 
 
 We find, other factors held constant including our estimate of the “expected” 
share of new hires that should be female, that institutions with female 
presidents/chancellors and female provosts/academic vice presidents, as well as those 
with a greater share of female trustees, increase their shares of female faculty at a more 
rapid rate. The magnitudes of the effects of these leaders are larger at smaller institutions, 
where central administrators may play a larger role in faculty hiring decisions. A critical 
share of female trustees must be reached before the gender composition of the board 
matters. 
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I. Introduction 
Between 1977 and 2007 the percentage of female new doctoral recipients from 
American universities increased from 24.8 to 45.4; the percentage increases in science 
and engineering fields were even more rapid.1 While the percentage of female faculty 
increased at American 4-year colleges and universities during the same period, the rate of 
increase varied across institutions and females remain under represented relative to their 
share of new doctoral recipients at our nation’s research universities, especially in science 
and engineering fields. Several recent National Research Council (NRC) reports have 
called attention to this discrepancy and some researchers have found evidence that 
females are more likely to major in science and engineering fields if the faculty in their 
introductory level classes are also female.2  
Our paper focuses on the role that the gender composition of the leaders of American 
colleges and universities – trustees, presidents/chancellors, and provosts/academic vice 
presidents – plays in influencing the rate at which academic institutions diversify their 
faculty across gender lines. While previous research has addressed the role that the 
gender composition of corporate leaders and corporate boards plays in influencing 
outcomes at corporations, including the gender mix of management, no research has 
addressed whether the gender mix of academic leaders similarly matters.3 Our analyses 
                                                 
1 The comparable percentage increases in the physical sciences, engineering and the life sciences were 9.8 
to 28.1%, 2.8 to 20.7%, and 20.8 to 51.4% respectively (Doctorate Recipients from United States 
Universities: Summary Report 2007  (2009), table 3) 
2 The NRC reports are Beyond Barriers (2007) and Gender Differences (2009).  The studies include Kevin 
Rask and Elizabeth Bailey (2002) and Scott Carrell, Marianne Page and James West (2009). Eric Bettinger 
and Bridget Long (2005) do not find evidence supporting the importance of having a female faculty 
member on female students’ choices of majors. 
3 See, for example, Lois Joy and Sarah Lang (2007), Alison Konrad,  Vicki Kramer and Sumru Erkut (2008) 
(2007), Firdan Ana Kurtuslu and Donald Toaskovic-Devey (2008), Diana Bilimoria (2006), Francine Blau 
and Jed Devaro (2007), William Carrington and Kenneth Troske (1998), and Lisa Cohen, Joseph Broschak 
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make use of institutional level panel data we have collected on the gender composition of 
trustees, presidents/chancellors, and provosts/ academic vice presidents at a large sample 
of American colleges and universities, as well as data on the gender mix of faculty and 
other variables collected annually as part of the IPEDS system. 
The next section describes the data that we use in our analyses and provides some 
descriptive statistics. Section III provides our analytic framework and econometric results 
follow in the next two sections. A concluding section provides a summary of our key 
findings. 
II. Data  
Table 1 presents IPEDs data on the shares of full-time professorial level faculty that 
were female at 1398 4-year colleges and universities in the United States. The sample is 
all 4-year institutions classified as bachelors, masters or doctoral institutions for which 
data were available in both 1984 and 2007. The mean share of female faculty increased 
from .220 to .405 during the 23 year period. The share varied across types of institutions 
in each year, being highest at the masters and lowest at the doctoral institutions and, 
within each institutional category, varied widely across institutions. 
The last panel of the table reports the mean changes in the share of female faculty in 
each institutional category over the 23 year period. While for the entire sample and each 
of the institutional categories, the mean change in the female faculty share during the 
period was about .18 to .19, there was considerable variation in the change in the female 
faculty share across institutions. The focus of our paper is in testing whether, other 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Heather Haverman (1998). Laura Giuliano, David Levine and Jonathan Leonard similarly investigate 
the influence of managers’ race on the race of new hires using personnel data from a large U.S retail firm. 
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factors held constant, the gender of an institution’s trustees and academic leaders 
influences the speed with which the institution diversified its faculty across gender lines. 
Information on the gender composition of voting members of boards of trustees and 
the gender of board chairs comes from a survey that the Cornell Survey Research 
Institute conducted for the Cornell Higher Education Research Institute (CHERI), under 
the auspices of the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges 
(AGB).4 Under conditions of strict confidentiality, the AGB provided CHERI with 
contact information for a sample of 745 4-year colleges and universities (a subset of the 
institutions whose data underlie table 1). Survey questionnaires, along with a cover letter, 
were mailed to institutions in March 2008, with follow up letters and phone calls taking 
place in April of 2008 and the second half of July 2008. When data collection was 
completed at the end of August 2008, 509 completed responses had been received, 221 
institutions refused to participate or did not respond to the survey and 15 institutions 
proved to be duplicates (more than one address was given to us for the same institution) 
or branch campuses of an institution whose board was the same as the main campus. 
Hence the response rate to the survey was 69.7% (509/730). These 509 responses actually 
represent 593 campuses because a number of the responses were from public university 
systems whose boards were responsible for multiple campuses. 
To say that the response rate was 69.7% is not to say that each responding institution 
reported data for all years between 1981 and 2007. As one might expect, institutions were 
more likely to report data for more recent years. For example, while 502 respondents 
reported data on the gender composition of their boards for 2007, the number of 
                                                 
4 More details about the survey and the survey results are found in Ronald Ehrenberg and Joyce Main 
(2009) and on the CHERI web page (www.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri ) 
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respondents declined to 376 by 1981. Similarly, the number reporting the gender of the 
board chair declined from 503 in 2007 to 341 in 1981. 
The decline in the response to the survey as one goes further back in time may lead to 
concerns that changes over time in the share of board with female chairs and in the 
average shares of board members that are female may be distorted by the changing 
composition of the institutions in the sample that are reporting data in each year. 
However, this proves not to be the case; the trends we found using data for all of the 
institutions that reported data in a given year are very similar to the trends that we found 
when we restricted the analyses to the subsample of institutions that reported data in 
every year.5 The average share of board members that is female rose steadily from about 
0.20 in 1981 to about 0.31 in 2007. Similarly the share of board chairs that are female 
rose from slightly under 0.10 in 1981 to about 0.18 in 2007.6 
Research on corporate boards has found that while having one or two females on a 
board can make a difference in board operations, it usually takes three or more women on 
board to achieve the “critical mass” needed to cause fundamental change on the board 
and to enhance the contributions that female board members make.7 Because board size 
varies widely across the institutions in our sample, we focus instead on the share of 
trustees that were female. Our econometric analyses will test if the gender of the board 
chair and either the share of female trustees, or a “critical share” of female trustees, 
influence the rate at which institutions diversity their faculty along gender lines.  
                                                 
5 Ehrenberg and Main (2009) 
6 The share of board chairs that is female and the share of board members that is female are also lowest 
each year at the doctoral institutions than at the masters and baccalaureate institutions. 
7 Konrad, Kramer and Ekrut (2008) 
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Annual data on the gender of the president/chancellor and the provost/academic vice 
president at each of the 593 campuses for which we have information on the gender 
composition of trustees was obtained from the annual publication Higher Education 
Directory. In cases where the gender of an individual could not be ascertained with 
certainty from the name, we searched the web to confirm the individual’s gender. During 
the 1983 to 2007 period, the share of presidents/chancellors in the sample that was female 
rose from 0.098 to 0.233, while the share of provosts/academic vice presidents that was 
female rose from 0.140 to 0.342. Public institutions were less likely than private 
institutions to have female senior academic administrators. The proportion of 
presidents/chancellors that was female was highest each year at baccalaureate institutions 
and lowest at the doctoral institutions, while the proportion of provosts/academic vice 
presidents that was female was lowest at the doctoral institutions in each year. 
 
III. Analytic Framework 
Given the share of faculty that is female at an institution in one year, the share that is 
female in the next year depends upon the turnover rates of female and male faculty and 
the share of new hires that is female. Estimates of faculty turnover rates, by institution 
and year, can be computed from the annual American Association of University 
Professor salary survey making use of the survey information on the number of 
continuing faculty reported by an institution in a year and then comparing this to the 
number of faculty reported by the institution in the previous year.8 However, sadly one 
cannot compute faculty turnover rates by gender from these data. So in what follows we 
are unable to control for differences in faculty turnover rates by gender. 
                                                 
8 See Ronald Ehrenberg, Hirshel Kasper and Daniel Rees (1991) 
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Our basic analytical approach is to use institutional level panel data to estimate 
equations of the form 
(1) Fit = a0 + a1Fit-1+ a2EXPit-1+a3FSit-1+ a4CTit-1 + a5STit-1+ a6PRESit-1+ a7PROVit-1+ 
eit 
Equation (1) specifies that the share of faculty that is female at an institution in a period 
(F) depends upon the share of faculty that was female in the previous period, the 
“expected share” of new faculty hires that was female in the previous period (EXP), the 
share of female students at the institution in the previous period (FS), the gender of the 
chair of the board of trustees, president/chancellor and provost/academic vice president 
(CT, PRES, PROV) in the previous period, the share of trustees that were female in the 
previous period (ST) and an error term (e), whose properties we will discuss shortly. 
 The lagged female faculty share variable is important because of the inertia in the 
process (low levels of faculty turnover) and because prior research suggests that female 
faculty turnover depends upon the share of female colleagues in a department, that 
females are more likely to be hired in science and engineering fields at research 
universities when there are females on the search committee, and that the proportion of 
tenured law school faculty members that is female influences the probability that new 
female candidates for tenure are awarded tenure.9 
 The share of new doctoral recipients granted by American universities that is 
female varies widely across fields in any year. For example, in 2007, the female share of 
new doctorates was 0.51 in the life sciences, 0.28 in the physical sciences, 0.59 in the 
social sciences, 0.21 in engineering, 0.67 in education, and 0.49 in the humanities.10 
                                                 
9 Pamela S. Tolbert, Tal Simons, Alice Andrews, and Jaehoon Rhee (1995 ), Gender Differences (2009) 
10 Doctorate Recipients from United States Universities (2009), table 3, and Richard Chused (1988) 
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Because of this, the “expected share” of new faculty hires that is female will vary across 
universities with the share of faculty at an institution that are employed in different fields 
and with the probabilities that faculty vacancies occur in each field.  
While data on faculty employment by field is not available for all the institutions 
in our sample, IPEDs does collect data on the number of degrees granted in each field. If 
one is willing to assume that the shares of faculty employed at an institution in each field 
are roughly proportional to the shares of degrees granted at the institution in each field 
and that faculty hiring at an institution in a year in each field is roughly proportional to 
the existing number of faculty in the field at the institution, then we can construct the 
expected share of new faculty hires that will be female in a year as the sum over all the 
fields in which degrees are granted at the university of the product of the share of degrees 
granted in each field times the share of new PhDs produced nationwide in the field  that 
are female. Our expectation is that holding lagged female faculty share constant, an 
increase in the expected share variable will be associated with an increase in the female 
faculty share in the current period. We use 2-digit Classification of Instruction (CIP) 
codes to develop our expected supply variable. There are approximately 50 of these 
subject matter codes, but the number of PhDs produced in several of these fields is zero 
in many years. For later reference, we note that the mean value of our expected share 
variable in our sample was 0.40 and the 25th to 75th percentile range was about 0.36 to 
0.47. 
 The lagged share of female students (FS) is included as an explanatory variable to 
see if institutions with higher shares of female students, other factors held constant, are 
likely to hire more female faculty. Finally, the other variables included in the analysis are 
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the ones that are of primary concern to us: the gender composition of the trustees and the 
genders of the board chair, the president/chancellor and the provost/academic vice 
president. 
IV. Econometric Results 
Table 2 presents estimates of equation (1) using institutional level panel data for 583 
institutions during the 1984-2007 period.11 The estimates in column (1) are GLS 
estimates that assume institutional level random effects, those in column (2) are from an 
institutional level fixed effects model, while those in columns (3) and (4) are from 
weighted random and fixed effects models, where the weights are the square root of the 
number of faculty at an institution.  
As expected the lagged female faculty share variable is a strong predictor of the 
female faculty share variable in a year. Holding constant the lagged female faculty supply, 
the expected share of new faculty hires that is female also matters. An increase in the 
expected share of 0.10, (slightly less than the difference between the 25th percentile and 
75th percentile value of the variable in the sample) is associated with a roughly 0.011 to 
0.018 increase in the female faculty share in the year. This contrasts to the mean annual 
increase of 0.0064 during the sample period. The share of female students also matters. 
Other factors held constant, an increase in the share of female students of 0.1 is 
associated with an increase in the female faculty share of roughly 0.002 to 0.007 in a year. 
Turning to the variables of primary interest to us, the genders of the chair of the board, 
the president/chancellor and the provost/academic vice president, as well as the share of 
                                                 
11 Ten institutions for which we had trustee data were eliminated from the econometric analyses because 
they are specialized institutions, such as religious seminaries and art institutes. Dichotomous variables were 
also included in the estimation to control for non reporting of the gender of the chair of the board and the 
gender composition of the board for an institution in a year. 
 10
the board of trustees that is female, all are associated with a more rapid increase in the 
share of faculty that are female. The gender of the board chair, however, is not 
significantly related to this outcome. The marginal impacts of having a female president, 
or a greater share of trustees that is female, are both smaller in the weighted random and 
fixed effects models than they are in the unweighted random and fixed effects models; 
this suggests that the effects are smaller at the larger institutions in which hiring decisions 
are much more decentralized. Put another way, the gender of the leaders appears to 
influence the speed with which institutions diversify their faculty along gender lines more 
at smaller institutions than at larger ones in which academic deans play much more 
important roles. 
The magnitudes of these trustee and senior administrator effects are quite large. 
Focusing on the weighted estimates, which are the smallest of the four models, having a 
female president/chancellor is associated, with an increase in the share of female faculty 
in a year of 0.002, holding other factors, including the lagged female faculty share and 
our expected supply variable constant. Having a female provost is associated with a 
slightly smaller effect. Each of these effects is about one-third the size of the mean year-
to-year increase in the female faculty share in the sample. Similarly, other factors held 
constant, an increase in the share of female trustees of .10 (say an increase from .20 to .30 
is associated with an increase in the female faculty share of about 0.0005; this is about 
one quarter of the magnitude of the effect of having either a female president/chancellor 
or provost/academic vice president. 
One might reasonably be concerned about whether having a female board chair or a 
higher share of female trustees increases the probability of observing a female 
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president/chancellor or a female provost/academic vice president and visa versa. That is, 
is it meaningful to talk about varying the gender of administrators, holding constant the 
gender of board members, and visa versa? Fortunately, the magnitudes of the president 
and provost coefficients that we obtain are about the same as those found in table 2 when 
we omit the trustee variables from equation (1) and the magnitudes of the trustee 
coefficients that we obtain when we omit the president and provost variables from 
equation (1) are about the same as those found in table 2 when we omit the president and 
provost variables from the equation. 
The coefficient estimates we obtain from the random effects models (columns 1 and 3) 
are very similar to the coefficients that we obtain from the comparable fixed effects 
models (column 2 and 4). Any unobserved institution effect that leads some institutions 
to diversify their faculty more rapidly along gender lines than other institutions would 
also cause the former institutions lagged share of female faculty to be larger than the 
latter’s lagged share. The similarity between our random effects and fixed effects model 
coefficients suggests that our controlling for the lagged female share on the right hand 
side of our model also has controlled for these unobserved institutional effects. 
Consequently, the discussion that follows will focus on the random effects model.12 
Does the impact of the share of trustees that is female depend upon some “critical 
share” of female trustees first being achieved? The estimates presented in table 3 provide 
the answer to this question. They are based on a variant of equation (1) in which the 
continuous share of female trustee variables is replaced by a set of dichotomous variables 
                                                 
12  Consider the general panel data model Yit = BXit + (ci + eit) where the ci are fixed effects and eit is a 
random error term. If the ci are uncorrelated with the Xit then both the fixed and random effects estimators 
are consistent estimators for B. If ci is correlated with the Xit  then the random effects estimator is biased. 
The similarity of our results when we use the fixed and random effects methods suggests that once for 
control for the lagged female share, any remaining bias is negligible. 
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that indicate whether the share of trustees is between .050 and .099 (prop5), .100 and .149 
(prop10), .150 to .199 (prop15), .200 to .249 (prop20), .250 to .299 (prop25), .300 to .349 
(prop30), .350 to .399 (prop35) or .400 or greater (prop40). The omitted category is a 
share of female trustees of less than .050, so the coefficients of each of these variables 
represents the “effect” of having a female trustee share in the interval relative to having a 
female trustee share of less than .050.  
 Quite strikingly, the coefficients of prop5, prop10, prop15, and prop20 are all 
roughly equal in magnitude and statistically insignificantly different from zero. However, 
the coefficient of prop25 is roughly double in magnitude and is statistically significant 
from zero. This suggests that a female share of trustees of at least .25 is required for 
female trustees to have a significant impact on the speed with which academic 
institutions diversify their faculty across gender lines. While the coefficient of prop30 is 
of the same order of magnitude as that of prop25, the coefficient of prop35 is about one 
and half times as large and that of prop40 more than twice as large, suggesting that the 
marginal impact of the female trustee share on the share of female faculty does increase 
once the female board share is more than a third. 
 Finally, one may legitimately be concerned about whether our analyses indicate a 
causal relationship between the gender of academic leaders and the change in the share of 
faculty that is female or simply that there were other factors that simultaneously caused 
both an increase in the share of female faculty and the “feminization” of academic leaders 
at an institution. In particular, readers of earlier versions of our paper have suggested that 
perhaps the push for gender equality that took place at academic institutions following 
the passage of Title IX helped lead to an increased share of both female faculty and 
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students at all institutions, which in turn provided a increasing pool of female candidates 
to fill both central administration and trustee positions.  
 One way to test for causality is to reestimate the institutional random effects 
models presented in table 2, adding as additional explanatory variables year fixed effects. 
The effects of any macro level unobserved variable in a year that simultaneously 
influences the share of female faculty and the gender mix of trustees and 
presidents/chancellors and provosts/academic vice presidents will be captured by these 
fixed effects and if the coefficients of the academic leader variables in these 
specifications are similar to those found in table 2, this will increase one’s confidence 
that we have isolated causal relationships. 
 The estimates from the random effects models that include year fixed effects 
appear in table 4. The estimated coefficients of the genders of the presidents and provost 
and the share of trustees that is female are very similar in both the unweighted and 
weighted regressions to the comparable coefficients in table 2. This provides support for 
the belief that the relationships we have observed are causal ones.13 
V. Extensions and Specification Tests 
Table 5 presents random effects estimates of equation (1) done separately for public 
institutions, private institutions, baccalaureate colleges, masters’ institutions and doctoral 
institutions. Because in each case the sample size used in the estimation is considerably 
smaller than the overall sample, the probability of our observing statistically significant 
                                                 
13 Another approach to the issue is to perform time-series tests to see if we can infer “granger causality” 
(C.W. Granger 1969). That is, can we infer that the gender of administrators and trustees “cause” the 
gender mix of the faculty but that the gender mix of the faculty does not “cause” the gender of 
administrators and trustees in a statistical sense? Unfortunately, we could not obtain unambiguous findings 
using this method.  
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coefficients is substantially smaller than in table 2. Hence we “liberally” interpret 
significance in this table to include significance at the 0.10 level.  
The lagged “expected supply” variable is statistically significantly positively 
associated with the share of female faculty for each group of institutions. The presence of 
a female president or a female provost in the previous year, is positively associated with 
the share of female faculty for each group (and significantly so for 8 of the 10 
coefficients) and, the magnitude of the effects for both is largest for the baccalaureate 
institutions, where central administrators are likely to play larger roles in the faculty 
hiring process as we conjectured above. While the share of trustees that is female in the 
previous year is significantly positively associated with the share of female faculty for 
four of the five specifications, the relationship for doctoral institutions is negative (but 
significant only at the 0.10 level). 
The number of new faculty hired at an institution in a year, by gender, is available 
from IPEDs for 9 of the years in our sample period (1993, 1995, and 2001-2007). Not all 
institutions hire any faculty members in each year, but for the subsample that do each 
year, these data permit us to estimate a variant of equation (1) in which the dependent 
variable is the share of newly hired faculty members in the year that are female. Random 
effects estimates of this equation appear in table 6.  
The coefficients of the “expected supply” variable, the gender of the president and the 
provost, the share of trustees that are female and the gender of the chair of the board of 
trustees are all female in this model, but none is statistically significantly different from 
zero. However, because the sample size used in the estimation in table 6 is about one 
third that used in table 2, the “t” statistics for the coefficients found in this table would be 
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roughly 1.7 times larger if the sample size was the same as in table 2. A perusal of the 
standard errors of these coefficient estimates suggests that all of these coefficients, save 
for the gender of the board chair, would have been statistically significantly different 
from zero with the larger sample size. Perhaps more important the magnitudes of these 
coefficients are all larger (in absolute value) than the comparable coefficients found in 
the first column of table 2.   
Finally, we are very sensitive to the fact that we have include a lagged dependent 
variable among our explanatory variables in our models and that this may lead to biased 
estimates of all of the coefficients in the models. In an attempt to control for this problem, 
we used an instrumental variable method similar to that used by Kurtulus and 
Tomaskovic-Devey (2008) in their study of the effect of female managers on the 
subsequent representation of females in management in U.S. firms. Basically, we 
obtained an instrument for the lagged female faculty share by regressing the lagged 
female share on the lagged and lagged two period values of the expected female faculty 
supply variable, the share of female students, the genders of the board chair, president 
and provost, and the share of trustees that is female, as well as the lagged two period 
value of the female faculty share.14 
Estimates of equation (1) that we obtained using this method are found in table 7 and 
they are qualitatively very similar to the random effects model results found in column 1 
of table 2. The expected female share of new hires and the gender of the board chair, the 
president/chancellor and provost/academic vice president in the previous period are all 
statistically significantly positively related to the current female faculty share, other 
                                                 
14 This procedure produces a valid instrument if the disturbance term is autocorrelated at no more than one 
lag. Given that we already have included a lagged dependent variable in our model, this specification 
allows for a great deal of dependence over time. 
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variables, including our instrument for the lagged female faculty share held constant. The 
magnitude of each of these effects is somewhat smaller than the comparable effect found 
in table 2, but qualitatively each remains important.15  
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Our paper has shown that the genders of leaders of America’s 4-year colleges and 
universities – trustees, presidents/chancellors, and provosts/academic vice presidents - are 
associated with the rate at which these institutions have diversified their faculty across 
gender lines during the 1984-2007 period. Other factors held constant, including our 
estimate of the “expected” share of new hires at an institution that should be female in a 
year, we find that institutions with female presidents/chancellors and female 
provosts/academic vice presidents, and with a greater share of female trustees, increase 
their share of faculty that are female at more rapid rates, Moreover, the magnitudes of the 
effects of these leaders appears to be largest at smaller institutions, where central 
administrators may play a greater role in faculty hiring decisions. We also found that 
there appears to be a critical share of female trustees that must be reached before the 
gender composition of the board of trustees influences the rate of diversification of the 
faculty across gender lines. 
Our study is only a first look at how the gender mix of leaders influences outcomes at 
academic institutions. It would be fruitful to extend our analyses to study how the gender 
of administrators “on the ground” who are more directly involved with hiring and 
retention efforts – deans and department chairs – influences the rate at which the faculty 
is diversified across gender lines. And we need to understand better why the gender of 
                                                 
15 When we reestimated this instrumental variable model clustering the standard errors by institution, the 
estimated coefficients remained the same but the statistical significance of the estimates declined 
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leaders matters. For example, the report of a recent National Research Council 
Committee, upon which one of us served, found evidence that the gender of the chair of a 
faculty search committee in science and engineering fields at major research universities 
influences the likelihood that female PhDs will apply for the position; apparently 
knowledge of the gender of the chair of the search committee signals something to 
potential female applicants about the seriousness of the department in wanting to expand 
female faculty employment and in providing leadership opportunities for female 
colleagues.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16  Gender Differences (2009) 
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                                                                Table 1 
Female Faculty Shares at 4-Year Institutions: 1984 - 2007 
  1984 Female Share 2007 Female Share Change in Share 1984 to 
2007 
 Obs 25th %ile Mean 75th %ile 25th %ile Mean 75th %ile 25th %ile Mean 75th %ile
Entire 
Sample 
1398 0.118 0.220 0.283 0.341 0.405 0.461 0.128 0.185 0.253 
Bachelors 478 0.116 0.226 0.309 0.349 0.413 0.466 0.112 0.187 0.278 
Masters 521 0.157 0.259 0.324 0.378 0.436 0.476 0.124 0.178 0.247 
Doctoral 250 0.101 0.157 0.192 0.299 0.342 0.380 0.157 0.186 0.219 
Public 584 0.136 0.209 0.262 0.343 0.392 0.441 0.146 0.183 0.232 
Private 814 0.102 0.228 0.305 0.341 0.414 0.474 0.111 0.186 0.276 
*Note: 149 specialized institutions (e.g. seminaries, art institutes, and health related 
colleges) included in the entire sample are not included in the bachelors, masters, or 
doctoral institution categories 
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                                                           Table 2 
Institutional Random and Fixed Effects Estimates of the Determinants of the Share of 
Female Faculty 
 Random Effects Fixed Effects Weighted 
Random Effects 
Weighted Fixed 
Effects 
     
F 0.788*** 0.683*** 0.814*** 0.809*** 
 (0.00516) (0.00621) (0.00515) (0.00528) 
EXP 0.111*** 0.183*** 0.131*** 0.135*** 
 (0.00687) (0.00783) (0.00550) (0.00564) 
FS 0.0650*** 0.0156** 0.0210*** 0.0180*** 
 (0.00491) (0.00697) (0.00484) (0.00498) 
PRES 0.00722*** 0.00544*** 0.00199** 0.00190** 
 (0.00143) (0.00159) (0.000836) (0.000845) 
PROV 0.00493*** 0.00236** 0.00153*** 0.00151** 
 (0.00109) (0.00114) (0.000620) (0.000626) 
ST 0.0233*** 0.0231*** 0.00539*** 0.00492** 
 (0.00357) (0.00419) (0.00230) (0.00233) 
CT 0.00198 0.00173 0.000985 0.000963 
 (0.00131) (0.00135) (0.000682) (0.000690) 
Constant -0.0140*** 0.0189*** 0.00170 -0.00578** 
 (0.00316) (0.00430) (0.00393) (0.00262) 
     
Observations 10583 10583 10583 10583 
R-squared  0.722  0.889 
Number of 
institutions 
583 583 583 583 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
where 
F - share of female faculty in the previous year 
EXP - "expected share" of new faculty hires that is female during the previous year 
FS - share of female students in the previous year 
PRES - 1 = female president/chancellor in the previous year 
   0 = otherwise 
PROV - 1 = female provost/academic vice president in the previous year 
   0 = otherwise 
ST - share of board of trustee members that is female in the previous year 
CT - 1 = board chair is female in the previous year 
   0 = otherwise 
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Table 3 
Random Effects Estimates: Critical Proportions Model 
F 0.787*** 
 (0.00517) 
EXP 0.113*** 
 (0.00698) 
FS 0.0652*** 
 (0.00498) 
PRES 0.00715*** 
 (0.00144) 
PROV 0.00491*** 
 (0.00109) 
CT 0.00231* 
 (0.00131) 
Prop5 0.00374 
 (0.00314) 
Prop10 0.00280 
 (0.00301) 
Prop15 0.00301 
 (0.00303) 
Prop20 0.00252 
 (0.00303) 
Prop25 0.00616** 
 (0.00311) 
Prop30 0.00503 
 (0.00322) 
Prop35 0.00926** 
 (0.00361) 
Prop40 0.0138*** 
 (0.00330) 
Constant -0.0144*** 
 (0.00402) 
Observations 10583 
Number of 
institutions 
583 
     Standard errors in parentheses    
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24
Table 4 
Random Effects Estimates of the Determinants of the Share of Female Faculty: Year 
Fixed Effects Included in the Model 
 Random Effects Weighted Random Effects 
   
F 0.802*** 0.921*** 
 (0.00504) (0.00336) 
EXP 0.0551*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.00833) (0.00461) 
FS 0.0750*** 0.0373*** 
 (0.00478) (0.00303) 
PRES 0.00712*** 0.00170** 
 (0.00138) (0.000693) 
PROV 0.00505*** 0.00172*** 
 (0.00107) (0.000541) 
ST 0.0165*** -0.000590 
 (0.00342) (0.00165) 
CT 0.00156 0.00190*** 
 (0.00129) (0.000628) 
YEAR 0.000751*** 0.000330*** 
 (9.13e-05) (4.95e-05) 
Constant -1.498*** -0.658*** 
 (0.181) (0.0980) 
   
Observations 10583 10583 
Number of unitid 583 583 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
where 
F - share of female faculty in the previous year 
EXP - "expected share" of new faculty hires that is female during the previous year 
FS - share of female students in the previous year 
PRES - 1 = female president/chancellor in the previous year 
   0 = otherwise 
PROV - 1 = female provost/academic vice president in the previous year 
   0 = otherwise 
ST - share of board of trustee members that is female in the previous year 
CT - 1 = board chair is female in the previous year 
   0 = otherwise 
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            Table 5 
Random Effects Model: By Institutional Type 
 Private Public Bachelors Masters Doctoral 
      
F 0.762*** 0.880*** 0.765*** 0.791*** 0.913*** 
 (0.00669) (0.00713) (0.00867) (0.00792) (0.00774) 
EXP 0.112*** 0.0894*** 0.103*** 0.114*** 0.0608*** 
 (0.00962) (0.00793) (0.0123) (0.0109) (0.00813) 
FS 0.0666*** 0.0119* 0.0617*** 0.0724*** 0.0145** 
 (0.00663) (0.00652) (0.00812) (0.00838) (0.00629) 
PRES 0.00865*** 0.00222* 0.0101*** 0.00480** 0.00147 
 (0.00215) (0.00130) (0.00268) (0.00214) (0.00144) 
PROV 0.00564*** 0.00131 0.00654*** 0.00370** 0.000518 
 (0.00158) (0.00104) (0.00198) (0.00169) (0.00110) 
ST 0.0373*** 0.00660* 0.0262*** 0.0301*** -0.00775* 
 (0.00659) (0.00374) (0.00833) (0.00622) (0.00406) 
CT 0.00283 0.00145 0.000901 0.00219 0.00166 
 (0.00224) (0.00103) (0.00250) (0.00191) (0.00142) 
Constant -0.00689 -0.00398 -0.000311 -0.0194*** -0.00170 
 (0.00455) (0.00331) (0.00584) (0.00528) (0.00256) 
      
Observations 6750 3833 4203 4249 2113 
Number of 
institutions 
379 204 234 234 113 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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                                                                  Table 6 
Random Effects Model: Share of New Faculty Hires 
F 0.200*** 
 (0.0504) 
EXP 0.142* 
 (0.0765) 
FS 0.157*** 
 (0.0458) 
PRES 0.0124 
 (0.0124) 
PROV 0.0157 
 (0.00978) 
ST 0.0766** 
 (0.0384) 
CT 0.00562 
 (0.0119) 
Constant 0.214*** 
 (0.0295) 
  
Observations 3690 
Number of 
institutions 
562 
            Standard errors in parentheses 
            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 
Instrumental Variables Random Effects Model 
F' 0.819*** 
 (0.00849) 
EXP 0.0445*** 
 (0.00861) 
FS 0.0344*** 
 (0.00665) 
PRES 0.00456*** 
 (0.00176) 
PROV 0.00236* 
 (0.00131) 
ST 0.0157*** 
 (0.00544) 
CT 0.00181 
 (0.00154) 
Constant 0.0261*** 
 (0.00429) 
  
Observations 9472 
Number of 
institutions 
582 
       Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
